We build an overlapping generations model in which reproductive households face a child quantity/child quality trade-off and bureaucrats are delegated with the task of delivering public services that support the accumulation of human capital. By integrating the theoretical analyses of endogenous growth, corruption and fertility choices, we offer a novel mechanism on the driving forces behind a salient feature of demographic transition. In particular, we attribute the decline in fertility to the endogenous change in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption that occurs at different stages of an economy"s transition towards higher economic development.
Introduction
One of the most striking aspects of demographic transition is the observation that the reduction in birth rates appears to coincide with an increase in the amount of resources that parents devote to the physical and mental development of each of their offspring. This fact has led to the idea that parents face a trade-off between child quantity and child quality -a trade-off whose balance shifts away from the former and towards the latter as an economy goes through the more advanced stages of its development process. Empirical support for this hypothesis has been provided by a plethora of analyses over the years (e.g., Rosenzweig In this paper we offer a new explanation for the aspect of demographic transition that we discussed above. In particular, we attribute it to the endogenous change in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption that occurs at different stages of an economy"s transition towards higher economic development.
The relation between bureaucratic corruption and economic development has been investigated extensively in the past. It is still a major issue of concern for economists interested in the dynamics of growth and development. Despite the fact that some earlier studies asserted that corruption may benefit economic growth through the role of bribery as "speed money" that reduces the costs associated with red tape (Leff, 1964) , the most recent evidence establishes a negative association between the incidence of corruption and economic growth. Mauro (1995) shows that public sector corruption has a negative effect on growth, mainly through its adverse impact on private investment. Keefer and Knack (1997) find that the lagged convergence of less-developed countries to the growth rates of developed countries is (to a large extent) attributed to deficient institutions and widespread corruption. Gyimah-Brempong (2002) presents evidence of a substantial adverse effect of corruption on the growth rate of real per capita GDP in African countries. Aidt (2009) studies the relationship between corruption, institutions and economic development, and finds evidence which suggests that corruption is a serious impediment to measures of 3 sustainable development that incorporate human capital, natural capital and institutional quality, in addition to physical capital investment. Gundlach and Paldam (2009) employ a novel methodological approach to show that the causality in the relation between economic development and corruption runs from the former to the latter. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) argue that the failing of democratic institutions can increase the incidence of corruption in economies that are rich in natural resources.
The argument we provide in our analysis is the following. The return to the resources that parents offer for the mental development of their children (for example, their human capital) is supported by the delivery of such productive services as public education, public health and other forms of public infrastructure investment. Insofar as bureaucratic corruption hinders the delivery and the quality of such services, parents will have a reduced incentive in providing resources that support child quality. Hence, they will find optimal to divert their resources towards child quantity. As the incidence of bureaucratic corruption may decline at advanced stages of economic development, a demographic transition may occur as a direct outcome of reduced corruption in the public sector of the economy.
We verify this assertion in the context of an overlapping generations model in which households face a child quantity/child quality trade-off and bureaucrats are delegated with the task of procuring public services that support the accumulation of human capital. At low stages of development, some bureaucrats find optimal to choose low quality public projects because this allows them to embezzle part of the funds that are otherwise devoted to the procurement of public services. At higher stages of development, the incentive for this type of malversation disappears. As a result of the two-way causal effects between economic growth and the incidence of corruption, the model admits a threshold effect that is responsible for multiple growth equilibria. Furthermore, this threshold effect is translated into a demographic transition which is solely attributed to the fall in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption: as the economy grows, the endogenous decline in corruption will improve the provision of productive public services, thus inducing households to substitute child quality for child quantity.
Our framework can also account for the empirical observation that fertility rates are volatile. 1 In our model, the source of this volatility is the possible indeterminacy in the realisation of corruption incentives. Particularly, it is possible that (for intermediate levels of Croix and Delavallade, 2011) to the best of our knowledge this is the first analysis to provide an explicit link between corruption, education and fertility choices. 2 Hence, it contributes to three distinct strands of literature -i.e., those analysing the links between education and economic growth, demographic transition and economic growth, and bureaucratic corruption and economic growth.
The remaining paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the basic set-up of our artificial economy. A more detailed discussion on the characteristics of the government, the bureaucrats, and the households are provided in Sections 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 shows that corruption is endogenously determined and establishes its effect on public services, whereas Section 7 derives the economy"s growth rate and attributes demographic transition to the reduction in the incidence of corruption. In Section 8, we enrich the set of penalties imposed to apprehended bureaucrats and discuss the equilibrium implications.
Section 9 concludes. captures the benefit from the productive public services that the government will offer in support of the adults" efforts to educate their children. The provision of these public services requires that the government employs people that are able to deliver them -this is where the distinction between households and bureaucrats becomes important. We assume that the only group of adults with the innate ability to use their labour in order to deliver public services are the bureaucrats; households do not possess this ability. However, all adults (households and bureaucrats) have the ability to work for private sector firms.
The Economy
We shall also assume that, if hired by the government, bureaucrats will have to devote their whole unit of time inelastically in the process of delivering public services. For this 6 reason, the remaining analysis will be making use of the assumption that nature does not bestow any altruistic motives to bureaucrats; only households are characterised by the altruistic motive to raise and educate children. Without this restriction, no bureaucrat would wish to work for the public sector because the time they would require for raising and educating their offspring would not allow them to devote the (required) unit of time in the process of procuring public services. Nevertheless, such occupational opportunity is essential for our analysis. Hence, we restrict our attention to and 1
Given the assumptions for the economy"s demographics, the restriction in (3) 
Furthermore, in what follows we are going to remove the superscripts from variables over which only a household makes a choice, i.e., (1), (2) and (3), a household member will choose how many children to rear, how much time to devote for the human capital of each child, as well as her consumption of the economy"s homogeneous good in order to maximise her utility 1 ln( ) (1 )ln( )
subject to
and 
As mentioned previously, these firms represent the only occupational option for households, whereas bureaucrats have two such options: they can be employed either in private sector firms or in the public sector. Thus, the equilibrium level of t L (which will be derived later) will take account of both households and bureaucrats employed in the private sector.
The Government
As we explained above, the government delegates the task of public service delivery to adults that have the ability to undertake such a task, i.e., to the bureaucrats. Every period, the government will devote t g units of output towards this purpose. We further assume that the government"s spending on public services is proportional to the economy"s GDP according 
The funds available for public service delivery will be equally allocated among public sector employees. The government will instruct them to use all these funds, together with their unit of time, in order to finance a project that delivers the desired public services. In exchange, each bureaucrat employed in the public sector will receive a remuneration equal to
There are two types of public projects that a bureaucrat can use in order to deliver public services. The Type-1 project"s return is random: it will deliver 1 ξ units of service, with . It is also natural to assume that the government will wish to ensure a given amount of public services at the minimum possible cost. This entails that the government employs the minimum number of bureaucrats necessary to guarantee that public projects can be operated at the minimum possible salary. With respect to the number of public sector employees, it is straightforward to establish that the number of bureaucrats hired will be 
Every period, the government abides by a balanced-budget rule. Formally,
According to (12) , the government allocates its tax revenues between its spending for the delivery of public services and the total labour costs of the public sector.
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The Bureaucrats
In this section we are going to discuss the characteristics of bureaucrats in more detail. We shall assume that they are heterogeneous in their moral attitudes concerning the option of misconduct that materialises when they work for the public sector. In particular, a fraction (0,1) p of bureaucrats are corruptible in the sense that, when the opportunity arises, they may find optimal to illegally expropriate public resources for their own personal benefit. The remaining fraction (1 ) (0,1) p of bureaucrats are non-corruptible in that they have a strong moral stance that deters them from considering the embezzlement of public funds. This innate characteristic is private information to each bureaucrat and it is not observable by the government.
As we mentioned in the preceding part of the analysis, the government offers a contract of B t t t ω w h that induces all bureaucrats to apply for a public sector job. Given its inability to observe each applicant"s innate characteristic (whether she is corruptible or not) the government will randomly pick a fraction κ of applicants and employ them in the public sector, instructing them to deliver public services according to the description of the previous section. Therefore, a number Of course, by observing the aggregate outcomes, in terms of public service delivery, the government will realise that some public sector workers engaged in wrongful conduct. In response, the government will use an imperfect monitoring technology that can identify, with probability (0,1) η , the bureaucrats whose behaviour was fraudulent. In this case, bureaucrats revealed as being corrupt pay a utility cost for their malversation: particularly, they face a proportional utility cost of (0,1) σ . This cost captures the psychological distress of imprisonment, social stigma, embarrassment etc. Given these, the utility of a corrupted bureaucrat is given by ( ) 
As it is evident from (14), the penalty for bureaucratic malfeasance is psychological (e.g., imprisonment) and not pecuniary (e.g., confiscation of wealth through a monetary penalty).
This may be the case where the corrupt official is successful in securing her wealth from government authorities (e.g., through money laundering). Nevertheless, to improve the robustness of our results under a more general setting, in Section 8 we modify the model by adding a pecuniary penalty as well. It will transpire that this addition will not alter the main implication concerning the impact of corruption on fertility decisions. Nevertheless, it adds further equilibrium outcomes that merit discussion on their own right.
The Households
Households allocate their unit of time optimally by solving the problem described in equations (5)- (7). We can use the first-order conditions associated with this problem to get 
Equation (15) reveals that the marginal utility cost and the marginal utility benefit of having children must be equal. The former is the total time (rearing and education) that the household devotes to her offspring. The latter is equal to the relative weight of the altruistic motive in the adult"s utility function. Given that this is constant, the result in (15) shows that the parent faces a quantity-quality trade-off in the determination of her family size.
Substituting (15) 
This result will determine the optimal amount of time that parents devote to the education of their offspring. By equation (15) , this will also determine the number of children that each household gives birth to. From equation (17) we can see that productive public services represent an important element in the determination of these outcomes, as this is manifested by the presence of the variable t F . Nevertheless, the ultimate provision of such public services depends on the extent of corruption among the bureaucrats who are delegated with the task of delivering them. In the next section, we turn our attention to this issue.
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From equations (13) and (14), it is obvious that a corruptible bureaucrat will act dishonestly as long as
or, alternatively, 
Given our previous discussion, the total amount of efficient labour in the economy will
i.e., it is the sum of the efficient labour supplied by bureaucrats that are not employed in the public sector and by households. Substituting (20) , together with (4) and (15) in (8) yields ()
where (1 ) (4), (9), (10) and (11), in the government"s budget constraint which is given in (12) . This will determine the equilibrium tax rate as
where ˆ(0,1) τ because (0,1) θ by assumption. Now, we can use (4), (9), (10), (11), (21) and (22) in (19) to get
As explained before, this condition determines a corruptible bureaucrat"s incentive to be corrupted. It allows us to derive . The intuition behind this outcome is straightforward: as the economy develops and improves its stock of human capital, diminishing marginal utility implies that the increase in the marginal benefit from being corrupted becomes progressively smaller compared to the increase in the marginal benefit from being honest.
Note that the result in Proposition 1 has interesting implications on how institutional characteristics may affect the long-term prospects of an economy, despite the fact that they do not impinge on the accumulation of human capital directly. They do so indirectly by determining the incentive for illegal rent-seeking by corruptible bureaucrats. As one can see from equation (A1) in the Appendix (where we provide an explicit expression for h ) in economies where the punishment for this type of misdemeanour is more severe (higher σ ) and more certain (higher η ) the scope for misconduct in public office is limited.
Of course, we expect that the occurrence of corruption will impinge on the provision of productive public services. To determine the extent over which this happens, let us derive the equilibrium for the variable t F . First of all, we shall assume that the public services offered by the government are non-excludable but rival: as more families try to access them, the benefit to each family becomes limited due to congestion. Formally, we can write
where t f denotes the overall amount of public services. Given the assumption about the two different types of projects through which bureaucrats can procur public services, we can associate the ultimate provision of these services with the incidence of the corruption Proof. See the Appendix. ■
As expected, the amount of productive public services that the government is able to offer depends on the occurrence of corruption among public sector workers. Insofar as some bureaucrats have the incentive to mislead authorities and expropriate funds away from productive investments, the economy will not be able to achieve its full potential in terms of public service delivery. Looking at equations (15) and (16), it is logical to expect that the effect of corruption on public service delivery will impinge on the economy"s demographics as well as the accumulation of human capital. These are outcomes that we analyse in the following Section.
Corruption, Growth, and Demographic Transition
Let us go back to equation (17) , multiply both sides by (21), (24) and (25) . Eventually, we get
We can use equation (26) 
where ee .
Proof. See the Appendix. ■
In an economy with relatively low levels of development, the presence of corrupted bureaucrats implies that the provision of public services is lower compared to the situation in which corruption among bureaucrats vanishes at relatively high levels of development.
However, these public services determine the parent"s utility return on spending time towards each child"s human capital formation. Thus, when productive public services increase, households finds optimal to boost their efforts for the improvement of their children"s human capital. Now, let us substitute tt hh , (21), (24) (25) and (27) in (7) to write the growth rate as
We can use equation (28) 
where ψψ .
Proof. It follows from equations (25), (27) and (28) . ■
The reason why there are multiple, path-dependent, growth equilibria in this economy rests on the two-way causal relation between corruption and development: on the one hand, a positive growth rate brings forth the relatively high level of development necessary to reduce the incentive for transgression by corruptible bureaucrats; on the other hand, the reduction of corruption implies a higher provision of productive public services which 6 The restrictions (1 ) 1 xq and (1 ) xare sufficient to rule out multiple solutions for t e .
improves the growth rate both directly and indirectly (through the higher effort that parents devote for the human capital improvements of their offspring).
In addition to the above, the model"s results have significant implications for the optimal fertility rate. In particular, our framework is able to generate a demographic transition which can be attributed to development-induced changes to the incidence of corruption. We can formalise this argument through Proof. Combining equations (15) and (27) (30) , this argument completes the proof.
■
We can see that the economy experiences a demographic transition which is attributed to the change in the occurrence of corruption. As the economy grows, at some point potentially corruptible bureaucrats will find optimal to behave honestly. The absence of corrupt actions among bureaucrats will enhance the provision of productive public services and will induce households to support the formation of their children"s human capital.
However, the presence of a quantity-quality trade-off implies that households will also decide to rear fewer children. Thus, a demographic transition occurs as a result of reduced corruption in the public sector of the economy.
Pecuniary Penalties for Corrupt Bureaucrats
In this section we consider the case where every corrupt bureaucrat who is apprehended by authorities faces a monetary penalty, in addition to the utility cost associated with being found guilty for her misdemeanour. In particular, we assume that the government is able to seize a fraction (0,1) μ of an apprehended bureaucrat"s total wealth (salary plus ill-gotten gains). In this case, the expected utility of a corruptible bureaucrat is (1 )ln (1 ) (1 )ln (1 ) (1 )
Therefore, she will act dishonestly as long as (1 )ln (1 ) (1 )ln (1 ) 
Substituting (4), (9), (10), (11) and (21) the projects and, therefore, deliver public services. 7 Of course, this is a costly decision given that these bureaucrats have to be compensated for their work. We shall assume that the total cost of hiring them is equal to
where 1 ζ is assumed in order to guarantee that it is certainly more costly for the government to hire bureaucrats from abroad instead of hiring domestic bureaucrats for the same purpose. If this was not the case, then it would make sense to hire foreign bureaucrats in the first place. Furthermore, we shall assume that all foreign bureaucrats will operate the Type-1 project. 8 Naturally, these events have repercussions for the government"s budget and, therefore, the equilibrium tax rate. To see this, we shall consider the two possible scenarios that emerge given the description of the economy"s environment. First of all, let us consider the case where all corruptible bureaucrats decide to behave honestly. It is straightforward to see that the government"s budget constraint is identical to the one given in (12) , thus leading to the tax rate t ττ , (35) that we obtained in (22) . Now, let us consider the scenario under which all corruptible bureaucrats behave dishonestly. Given the presence of a monetary penalty for those apprehended, the government"s budget constraint will become 
If we substitute (4), (9), (10), (11), (21) and (34) 
A comparison of (37) with (22) reveals that ττ . In other words, bureaucratic corruption leads to an increase of the (endogenously determined) tax rate. This is because the high cost of hiring bureaucrats from abroad, in order to deliver the services that domestic bureaucrats should have delivered in the first place, has to be met by a higher tax rate.
A look at equation (33) In comparison to Proposition 1, we can see that the presence of a monetary penalty for apprehended bureaucrats results in an additional case of multiple equilibria and indeterminacy. The reason for this outcome is associated with the positive feedback in the relation between corruption and taxation. On the one hand, the presence (absence) of bureaucratic corruption results in a relatively high (low) tax rate. On the other hand, the high (low) tax rate reduces (increases) the return from a bureaucrat"s legal income -i.e., her salary -thus increasing (lowering) the utility return from being corrupt.
Let us now consider the results concerning the delivery of public services. These results are established in 
Proof. See the Appendix. ■ So far we can observe that the results are similar to those established in the baseline model presented in Sections 2 to 7. In particular, the incidence of bureaucratic corruption determines the delivery of productive public services and, thus, determines the incentive of parents to devote resources for the accumulation of their children human capital. As we established before, higher corruption implies a lower procurement of public services, hence it motivates parents to reduce their own effort in support of their offspring education.
However, we can also check that the possible indeterminacy established in part (ii) of Proposition 6 has additional repercussions for the aforementioned outcomes. Naturally, such this transition is identical as well. Nevertheless, the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy for intermediate values of the economy"s human capital stock provides further and important implications concerning the outcomes that may transpire during this transition.
We can clarify this argument through the following
Corrolary. During periods for which T t T , the economy may experience endogenous fluctuations in
both growth and fertility rates.
As the previous corollary suggests, the economy may exhibit (endogenous) fluctuations in growth and fertility rates at some interval of its development process. These fluctuations are generated by some type of self-fulfilling prophecies in the determination of the ultimate actions by potentially corrupt bureaucrats. As it is evident from Proposition 6, whether these bureaucrats decide to engage in the extortion of public money depends on whether they expect a similar behaviour from others. On the one hand, a bureaucrat that expects the others to be corrupt will have the incentive to be corrupt as well; on the other hand, the expectation that the others will act honestly is an incentive to act in a similar manner. Of course, these interactions occur every period by different populations of (corruptible)
bureaucrats. Periods in which expectations are conducive to honest behaviour may be followed by periods in which such expectations provide the incentive for bureaucratic malfeasance and vice versa. Given that the changes in the incidence of corruption impinge on the quality of public services, they shift the balance of the quantity-quality trade-off faced by parents, thus they lead to corresponding changes to human capital accumulation, economic growth and fertility.
The idea that fertility rates may display fluctuations is not just a theoretical curio. On the contrary, the fact that fertility rates have displayed significant variations around their declining trends has been established empirically be various authors (e.g., Easterlin, 1987; have sought to explain. The result we summarised through the previous corollary may be thought as an additional explanation on the possible driving forces behind fluctuations in fertility rates.
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Conclusions
In this paper, we have sought to integrate the theoretical analyses of endogenous growth, corruption and fertility choices. We have thus offered a novel mechanism on the driving forces behind one of the important aspects of demographic transition. In particular, we argued that one of the causal links between economic development and fertility reductions is the decline in the occurrence of bureaucratic corruption.
Our analysis has focused in only one of the many facets through which public sector corruption may actually materialise. Apart from the obvious need for analytical tractability, this approach allowed us to present a theory in which all the analytical mechanisms are clarified and the intuition is not blurred. It would be interesting, however, to examine a framework in which corruption may permeate the highest ranks of public administration, i.e., the government. Another interesting approach is to give bureaucrats an altruistic motive towards their offspring and use such a framework to examine the issue of nepotism. All these issues are certainly fruitful avenues for future research.
